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We are programmed to receive 
You can check out any time you like 
But  you can never leave
“Hotel California” – The Eagles (1976)
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Abstract
This  paper  discusses  developments  in  the  Netherlands  concerning  unemployment 
insurance, unemployment assistance and disability insurance. The emphasis is on how 
incentives for individual workers and firms affect flows of benefit recipients. 





Recent surveys of the effectiveness of active labor market policies indicate that most of 
these  programs have limited effects. Kluve and Schmidt (2002) survey about 50 recent 
evaluation studies to conclude that programs with a large training content most likely 
improve employment probability. Furthermore, both direct job creation and employment 
subsidies in the public sector almost always fail. Kluve (2006) follows up on this and 
presents  an  analysis  of  about  100  evaluation  studies  of  active  labor  market  policy 
programs in Europe, most of them operating after 1990. He finds that the effectiveness 
of programs is quite independent of contextual factors such as labor market institutions 
and  macroeconomic  environment.  Whereas  traditional  training  programs  appear  to 
have at most a modest effect on transitions from unemployment to work private sectors 
incentive  programs,  services  and  sanctions  perform  significantly  better.  Direct 
employment  programs  in  the  public  sector  are  rarely  effective  and  frequently 
detrimental  for  the  employment  prospects  of  participants.  Providing  job  search 
assistance and counseling and monitoring accompanied by appropriate sanctions for 
noncompliance are especially effective and they are often quite cost-effective because 
their rather inexpensive nature .  
The emphasis on stronger incentives in labor market policy programs is a major 
characteristic of recent labor market policy in the Netherlands. Whereas in the 1970s 
the Netherlands were famous for the “Dutch disease” in the 1990s there was a “Dutch 
employment  miracle”.  In  recent  years  employment  growth  has  diminished  and 
unemployment  has  increased  somewhat  but  from  a  European  perspective 
unemployment rates are still quite low. What explains this long-lasting high performance 
of the Dutch labor market? According to Visser and Hemerijck (1997) three policy shifts 
are responsible for the “Dutch miracle”. First, there was wage moderation which started 
in the early 1980s and was concluded in negotiations between unions and employers in 
1982.  Because  of  this  the  competitiveness  of  the  Dutch  industry  increased  a  lot. 
Second, there was of reform of the social security system, starting with a freezing of 
benefits  in  1983  and  an  overhaul  of  unemployment  insurance  in  1987.  The  major 
reforms in social security took place in the early 1990s when disability insurance and 
sickness leave schemes were reformed. The third policy shift concerns the innovation 
of  labor market  policies and the emphasis on activating measures of  various kinds. 
Nickell and Van Ours (2000) conclude that the unemployment rate in the Netherlands 
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went  down because of  a significant  reduction of  the equilibrium unemployment  rate 
since the early 1980s. Responsible for this are wage moderation, the popularity of part-
time  work  and  the  re-enforcement  of  financial  incentives  for  work  for  unemployed 
workers collecting benefits.
Indeed, an important characteristic that distinguish the Dutch labor market from 
other European countries is the emphasis on financial incentives to get unemployed 
back to work or  prevent them from entering the pool of workers collecting disability 
benefits. In terms of unemployment insurance benefit sanctions the Netherlands and 
Switzerland are the two most strict European countries where in the late 1990s almost 
40% of the unemployment benefit recipients was confronted with a sanction.1 Benefits 
sanctions  refer  to  temporary  or  permanent  reductions  in  benefits.  They  affect  the 
behavior of unemployed workers in two ways – through an ex ante and through an ex 
post  effect.  The ex ante effect  refers to the optimal search intensity of unemployed 
workers who did not yet received a benefit sanction but who are aware of the possibility 
that they might be confronted with a benefit sanction. Then the optimal search intensity 
is higher than it would be if workers would not face the possibility of getting a sanction 
imposed. The ex post effect refers to the effect on search of having lower benefits once 
a sanction is imposed. The effect of benefit sanctions goes beyond the direct effects of 
workers searching more intense. The increase in search intensity may also stimulate 
employers to  open up new vacancies.  Boone and Van Ours  (2006)  show that  this 
macro spillover effect  may be an important  mechanism to reduce unemployment  in 
addition  to  the  micro  behavioral  effect  of  increased search intensity  which  reduces 
unemployment  duration.  Benefit  sanctions  require  a  system of  monitoring  in  which 
counseling may be important too. Finally, there are sanctions which may be imposed to 
employers because of lack of effort  to prevent workers from entering the system of 
disability benefits. 
This paper gives an overview of important changes in the social benefits system 
in the Netherlands and presents empirical evidence on how financial incentives affected 
stocks and flows in social benefits over the past decades. The focus is on three types of 
benefits:  unemployment  insurance  benefits,  unemployment  assistance  benefits  and 
disability  benefits.  The  studies  discussed  here  concern  policy  interventions  to 
strengthen  financial  incentives.  One of  the  main  problems in  the analysis  of  policy 
1 See Boone and Van Ours (2006) for details and Lalive et al. (2005) for an overview of the 
Swiss system of benefit sanctions.
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effects is accounting for selectivity. It may be that a policy is imposed on a group of 
workers that have different characteristics than another group of workers which is not 
confronted  with  the  policy.  If  the  imposition  of  a  policy  is  randomized  finding  the 
“treatment”  effect  is  rather  simple.  If  a  administrative  officer  decides  on  which 
individuals  a  particular  policy  is  imposed  complications  may  arise.  Then,  a  simple 
comparison of labor market outcomes of the two groups is unlikely to give an unbiased 
estimate  of  the  effect  of  the  policy.  If  the  differences  between  the  two groups  are 
observed  multivariate  analysis  can  account  for  these  differences  but  in  case  of 
unobservables  –  like  the  motivation  of  the  worker  –  there  is  no simple solution  to 
account for selectivity. 
This  paper  does   not  provide  new  empirical  evidence  that  is  not  already 
published elsewhere. The aim is to present and discuss Dutch studies where selectivity 
of  policy  interventions  has  been  taken  into  account.  The  paper  does  not  give  an 
overview of all empirical studies either but discusses some important studies in more 
detail to illustrate how incentives work in practice. 
The set-up of the paper is as follows. The next section describes developments 
in the Dutch labor market over the past decades with an emphasis on the three types of 
benefits. Sections 3 to 5 present the characteristics of these benefits in more detail and 
discuss a limited number of relevant empirical studies. Section 6 concludes. 
-2. ECONOMY AND LABOR MARKET
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the unemployment rate in the Netherlands over the 
period 1970 to 2005.2 As there is some discussion about which numbers should be 
used two series are presented. The first  series concerns “registered unemployment” 
favored by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, collectors of data. The second 
series concerns “job seekers without a job” which is the favorite series of the CPB – 
Netherlands  Bureau  for  Economic  Policy  Analysis,  data  crunchers  and  important 
advisers of Dutch government and parliament. The main difference between the two 
series concerns the questions of when an individual is looking for job and what type of 
job the individual should be looking for. As is clear from Figure 1 there are differences 
2 All data used in this paper are from the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and 
from the Netherlands Institute for Social Insurance (UWV). 
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between the two series but the general pattern of development is very much the same.3 
In the 1970s unemployment rates in the Netherlands slowly rise from about 1% to about 
4%. Then, in the beginning of the 1980s unemployment rates virtually explode to reach 
a peak of 11-12% in 1983. From then on until the early 1990s unemployment rates drop 
steadily  to 6-7% and after  a short  recession in the mid 1990s unemployment  rates 
decline further to about 2-3% in the early 21st century. In the first years of this century 
unemployment rates increase but are stabilizing in 2005.4 
The current Dutch welfare state originates from the introduction of many social security 
programs in the post-World War II period some of which are discussed in more detail in 
the  next  sections.5 In  the  1960s  and  1970s,  welfare  state  expenditures  expanded 
rapidly. In the 1970s the social security system was focused on income support, rather 
easy to enter with little incentives to leave – a kind of “Hotel California”. When the Dutch 
economy was hit by severe shocks in the seventies, generous benefits in combination 
3 The 'registered unemployment' series is close to the OECD standardized unemployment rate 
but unfortunately this series is discontinued in 2004 due to lack of information about particular 
characteristics of the search behavior of unemployed workers.
 
4 See Van Ours (2006) for details of recent developments. 
5 This stylized description of developments is based on De Mooy (2006). 
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with lax administrative controls caused an inflow of redundant workers in social security 
schemes with open-ended benefits. When the second oil crisis hit the economy at the 
end of the 1970s, the Dutch economy was confronted with declining employment and 
rising  unemployment.  In  the  beginning  of  the  1980s  taxation  and  social  security 
contributions accounted for  about half  of  GDP and for  every ten employed persons 
there were more than eight persons on social benefits. In the course of the 1980s the 
reform of the welfare state began, initially with changes in benefit levels and later on 
with institutional reforms that also included the public sector. As a result public sector 
wages  and  social  benefits  no  longer  increased  as  much  as  private  sector  wages. 
Furthermore, replacement rates in UI benefits were reduced from 80% to 70% of gross 
wages and the minimum wage, to which the minimum social benefits are linked, was 
frozen in nominal terms, which reduced the minimum wage from 61% of the median 
wage in 1980 to 47% in 2000. The cut in disability benefits was partly offset through 
supplementary  arrangements  negotiated  in  collective  labor  agreements.  Moreover, 
generous  early  retirement  schemes  were  introduced  which  reduced  the  effective 
retirement age of elderly workers. In the 1990s, institutional reforms continued: eligibility 
criteria for social benefits were tightened, the legal definition of the appropriate job was 
widened  in  the  disability  scheme,  the  government  reduced  the  discretion  of 
decentralized administrations by issuing specific criteria for determining disability and 
residual earning power, and a program of reassessment of disability claims started in 
1994.  Furthermore,  sickness  insurance  was  privatized  and  competition  in  disability 
insurance  was  introduced  to  achieve  efficiency  gains  in  the  implementation  and 
administration  of  the  insurance.  In  the  early  years  of  the  21st century  institutional 
reforms continued in the systems of unemployment insurance and disability insurance. 
The responsibilities for unemployment assistance benefits were decentralized and early 
retirement schemes were transformed in actuarially more fair schemes.  
Recent  information  about  employment  rates  and  unemployment  rates  in  the 
Netherlands is provided in Table 1. As shown employment  rates (employment as a 
percentage of the relevant population) are rather low among individuals aged 15 to 24, 
which is not surprising since many of the youngsters are still in the educational system. 
For women employment rates are highest in the age group 25 to 34 to decline at higher 
ages. In the highest age group only about 1 in 4 women has a job. For men between 25 
and 54 employment rates are about 85%. Also for men employment rates among older 
individuals are quite low; about half of the men in the age group 55 to 64 have a job. In 
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2004 the unemployment rate among women is on average slightly higher than among 
men but the difference is small – 4.5% and 4.2%. There are hardly any differences in 
unemployment rates between the age groups. 
Table 1 Employment rates and unemployment rates in the Netherlands – 2004/5
Women Men
Age Employment Unemployment Employment Unemployment
15 to 24 36.8 4.7 39.8 5.0
25 to 34 73.3 4.8 86.9 4.0
35 to 44 65.7 4.3 87.5 3.8
45 to 54 60.8 4.4 85.2 4.2
55 to 64 26.9 4.2 52.3 4.6
Total 54.1 4.5 72.1 4.2
Note: Employment rate = Employment as a percentage of the population (2005)
Unemployment rate = Registered unemployment as a percentage of the labor force (2004)
Table 2 shows information about benefit recipients by gender and age group. For both 
women  and  men  aged  15  to  24  the  share  of  workers  collecting  unemployment 
insurance is very low. This mainly has to do with entitlement effects; workers with little 
work experience are usually only entitled to 6 months of unemployment insurance while 
older workers are entitled to longer UI benefit durations. For the age categories 25 to 54 
the percentage of workers collecting unemployment insurance is about 4% while for the 
age category 55 to 64 this is about 9-10%. Concerning unemployment assistance there 
is not a lot of variation by age group with the exception of women in the highest age 
category. Among women aged 55 to 64 a number equal  to 15% of  the labor force 
collects  unemployment  assistance.  Combining  unemployment  insurance  and 
unemployment  assistance  of  the  women  in  the  age  category  55  to  64 about  24% 
collects benefits while for men in the age category this is about 15%.  Note that there is 
a big difference between the age dependency of the unemployment rate and the benefit 
recipient  rate.  The  unemployment  rate  among  older  workers  is  very  similar  to  the 
unemployment  rate  among  prime  age  workers.  However,  the  benefit  recipient  rate 
among older workers is substantially higher than among prime age workers. This has to 
do with search requirements. For a long time workers older than 57.5 years were not 
obliged to search for a job to remain eligible for UI benefits. Therefore, a large part of 
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them was counted as “registered unemployed”.6
Table 2 Benefits by age group – 2004 (population 15 to 64 years)
Women Men
Numbers (1000) UI UA DI UI UA DI
15 to 24 9 19 3 9 14 1
25 to 34 34 42 37 32 32 18
35 to 44 41 50 77 46 40 58
45 to 54 32 41 109 43 33 121
55 to 64 23 39 129 52 28 213
Total 139 191 355 182 147 411
Percentage of labor force
15 to 24 2.1 4.5 0.6 1.8 3.0 0.3
25 to 34 3.9 4.8 4.3 3.1 3.1 1.7
35 to 44 4.5 5.6 8.5 3.7 3.2 4.7
45 to 54 4.3 5.6 14.8 4.1 3.2 11.6
55 to 64 9.1 15.0 49.9 9.8 5.2 39.7
Total 4.4 6.0 11.1 4.2 3.4 9.5
Note: UI = Unemployment Insurance, UA = Unemployment Assistance, DI = Disability Insurance
In terms of percentage of the labor force the number of individuals collecting disability 
insurance  is  larger  among  women  than  men.7 Furthermore,  the  use  of  disability 
insurance is highly age dependent. Among young individuals the use is less than 1% of 
the labor force but among individuals aged 55 to 64 the use is about 50% for women 
and about 40% for men. For every age group the use of disability insurance is higher 
among women. Information about dynamics in recipients of unemployment insurance, 
unemployment assistance and disability insurance is shown in Table 3. Unemployment 
insurance is characterized by a lot of dynamics. For women for example the average 
stock collecting unemployment insurance in 2005 is about 140,000 while the inflow and 
outflow are about  180,000. Using the ratio  of  stock and outflow as a proxy for  the 
6 In addition to that some older workers may be part-time employed while at the same time 
collecting unemployment benefits. Also these workers would not be counted as “registered 
unemployed”.    
 
7 Note that individuals collecting disability insurance usually are no part of the labor force but 
the percentages are in terms of the labor force to make comparisons between the different 
types of benefits easier. 
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duration,  the average duration  of  unemployment  insurance is  about  9.3  months  for 
women and about 8.9 months for men. For unemployment assistance the average flows 
are far below the average stocks indicating durations of several years. Indeed, using 
the same proxy the average duration of unemployment assistance for women is about 
3.9 years, while for men it is 2.6 years. For disability insurance the dynamics are even 
smaller. The average duration of disability insurance is 8.2 years for women and 8.8 
years for men. 
Table 3 Stocks and flows in Dutch benefits – 2005 (population 15 to 64 years)
Women Men
Numbers (1000) Inflow Outflow Stock Inflow Outflow Stock
Unemployment Insurance 182 181 140 210 226 167
Unemployment Assistance 51 49 191 59 56 147
Disability Insurance 10 40 325 10 43 378
Percentage of labor force
Unemployment Insurance 5.7 5.7 4.4 4.9 5.2 4.4
Unemployment Assistance 1.6 1.6 6.0 1.4 1.3 3.4
Disability Insurance 0.3 1.2 10.2 0.2 1.0 8.7
Note: Average duration (ratio of stock and outflow): Women Men
UI:  9.3 months   8.9 months
UA: 3.9 years        2.6 years
DI:  8.2 years  8.9 years
-3. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
-3.1 Characteristics and developments 
Figure 2 presents the developments in stocks and flows of unemployment insurance 
benefits. It is clear that the cyclical fluctuations in the number of UI benefits are the 
same  as  those  in  the  unemployment  rate  but  the  magnitudes  are  quite  different. 
Whereas the peak in the unemployment rate is in the first half of the 1980s the peak in 
the number of UI benefits is in the first  half of  the 1990s. The main reason for this 
difference is the average duration of unemployment benefits which has substantially 
increased over time, in particular after the reform of the UI insurance in 1987. As will be 
discussed in more detail below this reform introduced age-specific entitlement rights for 
UI benefits which could last for several years for older workers while up to the reform UI 
benefits lasted for at most 6 months. In 1970 the average duration of UI benefits was 
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about 2 months, in 1986 this was about 3 months but from 1993 onwards average UI 
duration was about 9 months. Figure 2 also shows that inflow into UI and outflow from 
UI fluctuate closely together, with the inflow leading the outflow. 
The law on unemployment insurance benefits was introduced in 1949 to insure workers 
against  the  financial  consequences  of  unemployment.  If  workers  that  became 
unemployed had worked for at least 156 days in the calendar year before they entered 
unemployment  they were  entitled to UI  benefits;  usually  they received 80% of  their 
previous wage for a period of maximum 6 months. The increase in unemployment in the 
early  1980s triggered a discussion on the characteristics  of  the UI  system and the 
nature  of  the  insurance was  adjusted through changes in  eligibility  and entitlement 
criteria. For example in 1985 the replacement rate was reduced from 80% to 70%. Box 
1 presents a stylized overview of these changes. January 1, 1987 there was a major 
restructuring  of  the UI  system.  Part  of  the UA benefits  were    transformed into  UI 
benefits, potential benefit durations were made dependent on previous work experience 
et cetera. Although some of the characteristics have changed since 1987 by and large 
the  1987  rules  still  hold.  Entitled  to  Unemployment  Insurance  (UI)  benefits  are  all 
employees who involuntarily become unemployed and loose their earnings for at least 5 
hours or half of their working hours. They must have been employed for a particular part 
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BOX I. Unemployment insurance benefits
The law on unemployment insurance benefits (WW) was introduced in 1949 and intended to 
insure workers against the financial consequences of unemployment. 
Period 1: 1949 – 1986 
Workers  were  entitled  to  unemployment  benefits  if  in  the  12  months  before  they  became 
unemployed  they had worked for at least 156 days. The replacement rate was 60%, 70% or 
80% of the previous wage depending among others on whether or not the worker was a bread-
winner. The maximum duration of the benefit was 6 months. January 1, 1985 the replacement 
rate was reduced from 80% to 70%. 
Period 2: 1987 – 1995 
January 1, 1987 a new unemployment insurance law was introduced which combined the old 
law and part of the UA benefit system (WWV). Workers were entitled to unemployment benefits 
if in the 12 months before they became unemployed they had worked for at least 26 weeks. In 
the first 6 month of unemployment the replacement rate was 70% of the previous wage. If the 
worker had worked for at least 3 years (for at least 8 hours per week; since January 1, 1992 for 
at least 52 days in these 3 years) in the 5 years preceding unemployment (s)he was entitled to 
an  extension  of  the  benefit  period.  The  extension  depended  on  the  work  experience  and 
ranged from 3 months with 5 years of work experience to four and a half years with 40 years of 
work experience. If the worker was still unemployed after this second period in which (s)he was 
entitled to 70% of the previous wage the worker was entitled to 1 year additional welfare related 
benefits – with the exception of workers who were age 57 and a half of older at the first day of 
their unemployment spell.  These workers were entitled to unemployment benefits until  they 
reached age 65 and became entitled to old-age benefits. 
Period 3: 1995 – 2005  
March 1, 1995 the entitlement rules changed. Eligibility criteria were made more strict. Workers 
are  entitled  to  the  first  two  years  of  unemployment  benefits  if  in  the  39  weeks  prior  to 
unemployment they had worked for at least 26 weeks (in stead of 26 out of 52) and if in the 5 
calendar years prior to unemployment the worker had a job for at least 4 calendar years (in 
stead of 3 out of 5) with at least 52 working days. The duration of the extended unemployment 
benefits  became 2  years.  Individuals  that  fulfilled  the  first  entitlement  criterion  but  not  the 
second were entitled to 6 months of unemployment benefits. The replacement rate remained 
70%. In 1998 the industry based administrative organizations responsible for the payment of UI 
benefits were merged to 4, in 2002 there was a further merger to 1 institute (UWV). August 11, 
2003 the period of extended  unemployment benefits was abolished. From January 1, 2005 in 
calculating the potential benefit period, hypothetical work experience is partly transformed into 
actual work experience. Work experience is now actual work experience from 1998 onwards + 
hypothetical work experience up to 1998 (which is 1998 – 18 – year of birth). 
Period 4: From 2006 
In  the  course  of  2006,  the  Dutch  government  intends  to  introduce  a  new Unemployment 
Insurance Act The maximum duration of unemployment benefits will be 38 months. The benefit 
level  will  be  raised  from  70%  to  75%  of  the  last  wage  during  the  first  two  months  of 
unemployment. After this initial period, benefits will be reduced to 70%. The new act will have 
more stringent entitlement conditions. In particular, entitlement will require that someone has 
worked 26 out of 36 weeks prior to the application. The 4 out of 5 years condition will still hold. 
People who meet these conditions will be entitled to unemployment benefits for the duration in 
months that is equals to the employment record in years prior to the application. People who 
meet the 26 out of 36 criterion but not the 4 out of 5 criterion will only be granted benefits for a 
period of 3 months. 
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of the period before they enter unemployment. Initially this was at least 26 consecutive 
weeks out of the 52 weeks prior to unemployment (26 out of 52 weeks condition); later 
on this changed into 26 out of 39 weeks. Excluded from UI-benefits are individuals who 
receive full-time disability benefits or have reached the age of 65. Benefits end when 
individuals  are  no longer  unemployed  or  reach  the  maximum benefit  duration.  The 
potential benefit duration (PBD) and the benefit level depend on the type of UI-benefits 
that  can  be  collected.  Individuals  may  be  eligible  for  short  term  benefits,  wage 
dependent  benefits  or  extended  benefits.  Eligibility  for  these  three  benefit  types 
depends on labor experience and the age at which the individual becomes unemployed. 
If  an unemployed  individual  meets  the 26 out  of  39 weeks  condition and has also 
received wages for at least 52 days in the 4 calendar years during the 5 years prior to 
unemployment (4 out of 5 years condition), he or she qualifies for wage dependent 
benefits. These benefits last for at least 6 months and are extended with 3 months to 
4.5 years, depending on labor experience. Initially, labor experience was calculated as 
the  number  of  years  in  the  5  calendar  years  prior  to  unemployment  in  which  the 
individual has received wages for at least 52 days, plus the number of calendar years 
between the year that the individual turned 18 and the 5 years prior to unemployment. 
In 2005 a larger part of actual labor market experience was used to determine potential 
benefit durations. As a result of the 4 out of 5 years condition, the PBD for wage related 
benefits  depends  almost  completely  on  the  age  at  which  the  individual  becomes 
unemployed. All individuals who received wage related UI-benefits were also entitled to 
extended benefits. From August 11, 2003 on, extended benefits have been abolished. 
In  the  course  of  2006,  the  Dutch  government  intends  to  introduce  a  new 
Unemployment  Insurance  Act  (De  Mooij,  2006).  Compared  to  the  old  scheme,  a 
number of changes will  be implemented. First, the new act will  reduce the maximum 
duration of unemployment benefits from 60 to 38 months. The maximum period will only 
apply to people with an employment record of 38 years. Second, the benefit level will be 
raised from 70% to 75% of the last wage during the first two months of unemployment. 
After this initial period, benefits will  be reduced to 70% which is equal to the current 
level. Third, the new act will have more stringent entitlement conditions. In particular, 
entitlement  will  require  that  someone has  worked  26  out  of  36  weeks  prior  to  the 
application in stead of the current 26 out of 39 weeks. The 4 out of 5 years condition will 
still hold. People who meet these conditions will be entitled to unemployment benefits 
for the duration in months that is equals to the employment record in years prior to the 
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application.  Hence,  if  an  applicant  has  worked  7  years,  he/she  receives  7  months 
benefits. People who meet the 26 out of 36 criterion but not the 4 out of 5 criterion will 
only be granted benefits for a period of 3 months. 
In  recent  years  there  have  been  a  couple  of  studies  on  incentives  for 
unemployed workers to find jobs. Three types of incentives will be discussed in more 
detail  to illustrate the structure of the incentives. The studies are on monitoring and 
benefit sanctions, counseling and monitoring (and benefit sanctions), and eligibility and 
entitlement effects for older workers. 
-3.2 Monitoring and benefit sanctions
Concerning monitoring and benefit sanctions there are a few theoretical studies. Boone 
and Van Ours (2006) find that a system with monitoring and sanctions represents a 
welfare  improvement  relative  to  other  alternatives.  Benefit  sanctions  will  affect  job 
search behavior of the sanctioned because of the benefit reduction (ex-post effect) but 
also the search behavior of the non-sanctioned due to stricter monitoring of job search 
requirements  (ex-ante  effect).  Boone  et  al  (2006)  analyze  the  design  of  optimal 
unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among 
the unemployed is not perfectly observable. They examine to what extent the optimal 
policy  should  involve  monitoring  of  search  effort  and  benefit  sanctions  if  observed 
search is found insufficient. The results suggest that the introduction of a system with 
monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement. 
In  August  1996  a  new  law  on  benefit  sanctions  was  introduced  in  the 
Netherlands. Under this law people who receive UI benefits got a reduction of their 
benefits  if  they  didn't  follow  the  rules  related  to  the  benefits.  Figure  3  presents 
information  about  the  use  of  UI  benefit  sanctions  over  the  past  20  years.  As  a 
percentage of the stock of UI benefits the sanction rate increased substantially from 
1996  onwards,  from  about  25% to  45%.  In  recent  years  there  is  a  decline  in  the 
sanction rate which is due to the number of sanctions being imposed to be roughly 
constant while the number of UI benefits increased. 
Abbring et al. (2005) analyze how benefit sanctions affect the transition out of 
unemployment using data from the early 1990s. To illustrate how the system of benefit 
sanctions operates their description is used. According to the UI Law, an unemployed 
worker has three obligations in order to be entitled to UI benefits. First, he has to 
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prevent  unnecessary job loss.  Second,  he has to take actions to prevent him from 
staying unemployed (search for a job and accept appropriate job offers, register as a 
job searcher at the public employment office, participate in education and training, et 
cetera). Third, he has to keep the administrative organization informed about everything 
that is relevant to the payment of the unemployment insurance benefits. Related to this 
there are four categories of infringements for which workers can have benefit sanctions 
imposed: blameworthy unemployment after dismissal, lack of effort to find a job (search 
intensity too low, declining job offers), administrative infringements (reporting too late), 
and other infringements (fraud, inaccurate information).
UI agencies were  authorized, but  not  obliged, to impose a sanction on a UI 
claimant who did not comply with the rules. The sanction is a temporary or a permanent 
full or partial reduction of the benefit level. In practice, the temporary partial reduction of 
the benefits ranged from 5% during 4 weeks to 25 or 30% during 13 weeks. 
In the process of imposing a sanction there are a number of phases. The first 
phase is the observation of an infringement. Some offenses are more easy to detect 
than others.  At the start  of  his unemployment  period the worker  has to give the UI 
administration agency information about his previous job and the reason he became 
unemployed.  Therefore, it  is quite easy to establish whether or not the worker is to 
blame because  of  insufficient  action  to  prevent  job  loss.  A  first  investigation  as  to 
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Unemployment benefits Benefit sanctions
whether the unemployed search sufficiently is based on the “declaration of activities” 
the worker has to fill in at regular time-intervals. This declaration gives an overview of 
activities  to  find  a  job.  The  general  rule  is  that  there  should  be  at  least  one  real 
application per week. A real application is one that can be checked by contacting the 
employer  to  which  the  application  was  addressed.  The  unemployed  worker  should 
accept  offers  concerning  a  “suitable  job”,  defined  by  the  UI  agencies  in  terms  of 
characteristics like previous occupation, education and earnings. Generally, the longer 
the duration of unemployment the more workers  have to adjust their  preferences in 
terms of  temporary work, less pay, longer commuting or even moving.  The second 
phase is  the administrative  preparation  of  a decision to  impose a sanction.  Ideally, 
during this phase the worker is asked to give his opinion about the infringement and, 
depending on the type of infringement, employers are contacted. However, in practice 
these steps are often omitted as the UI agencies have limited resources. In the third 
phase,  a  decision  about  the  sanction  is  made  by  a  committee  consisting  of 
representatives of unions and employers' organizations. In the fourth phase, there may 
be an appeal against the decision to impose a sanction in which case a judge of the 
Council  of  Appeal  scrutinizes  the  decision.  If  the  worker  or  UI  agency  object  the 
decision of this judge, they may appeal at the Central Council of Appeal. However, in 
the early 1990s only 2% of the workers who got a benefit sanction imposed actually 
appealed against the decision. The sanction procedures are careful, but do not take a 
lot of time. UI agencies usually react within a week to failures to provide information on 
e.g. search activities. Since individuals are closely monitored after a sanction they have 
an  incentive  to  comply  with  the  search requirements  in  order  to  prevent  additional 
punishments. All this is likely to increase the search intensity of the individual from the 
moment at which the sanction is imposed onwards.
Abbring et al. (2005) analyze how benefit sanctions affect the transition out of 
unemployment  using data on UI  spells  that  started  in 1992 and  are followed up to 
September 1993. The focus is on two industries, the metal industry and banking sector. 
The metal industry sample contains about 8000 spells of which a quarter is female; the 
banking sector sample concerns about 32000 spells of which half relates to females. 
The sanction rates are not very high; on average 2-3% of the individuals in the sample 
were confronted with a benefit sanction. The main problem in the empirical analysis is 
the potential endogeneity of sanctions. If the imposition of benefit sanctions is selective 
– for  example because they hit  only unmotivated workers  – the estimated sanction 
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effect will  be biased if this selectivity is not accounted for. The authors deal with the 
selective  imposition  of  benefit  sanctions  by  modeling  both  the  process  by  which 
unemployed  find  jobs  and  the  process  by  which  they  are  confronted  with  benefit 
sanctions, and allowing these two processes to be correlated through observed and 
unobserved determinants. The authors find that re-employment rates are significantly 
and substantially raised by imposition of a sanction. Individual re-employment rates of 
males increase by about 60% in the metal industry and by about 35% in the banking 
sector. For females, these effects are 100% for the metal industry and 85% for banking. 
Estimates on data in which the metal  and banking industries are pooled with  other 
industries suggest economy-wide sanction effects of 60 to 65%. The main explanation 
for  the  considerable  effects  of  benefit  sanctions  is  that  benefits  change  concerns 
workers with a low income who have limited possibilities for  consumption smoothing to 
deal with the shock in income. The authors also note that in their data set sanctions are 
only imposed in a small fraction of the UI cases. Therefore, one should be careful in 
extrapolating their findings to a much stricter monitoring and sanction regime without 
considering the equilibrium effects of such a broad reform of the UI system. 
-3.3 Counseling and monitoring 
In  theory,  counseling  i.e.  job  search  assistance  should  lead  to  an  increase of  the 
effectiveness of search and therefore to an increase in the job finding rate. After all, if 
this would not be the case, the counseling would not be “true” counseling but merely a 
nuisance  to  unemployed  workers.  Monitoring of  search activities  in  theory leads  to 
substitution  from  informal  search  methods  to  formal  search  methods.  After  all,  if 
monitoring  of  insufficient  search  leads  to  the  imposition  of  benefit  sanctions  the 
unemployed  worker  has  an  incentive  to  search  through  methods  that  are  easy  to 
monitor (Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006).
The effectiveness of counseling and monitoring has been studied in detail by 
Gorter and Kalb (1996) and by Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006). The studies 
differ in terms of the type of unemployed workers investigated. When workers become 
unemployed in the Netherlands they are classified into one of  four categories.  This 
profiling  of  the  unemployed  is  based  on  individual  characteristics  such  as  age, 
education and work experience but also on subjected measures such as expected job 
search behavior, flexibility, and language skills. Type I individuals are expected to have 
sufficient skills to find a job. Type II and III individuals are considered not to have the 
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skills  to  find  work  without  training  and schooling.  Type IV  individuals  are  the  most 
disadvantaged and need more care. They are often unable to work or not obliged to 
search for work  and concern for example lone parents with dependent children or drug 
addicts. Gorter and Kalb (1996) investigate the effects of counseling and monitoring in a 
sample of type II-IV unemployed workers collected at the end of the 1980s, whereas 
Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw focus on a sample of type I unemployed collected at 
the end of the 1990s. 
Gorter  and  Kalb  (1996)   analyze  data  from a  field  experiment  with  random 
assignment  of  counseling  and  monitoring  to  UI  recipients  that  started  their 
unemployment spell in the period November 1989 to January 1990. Individuals were 
interviewed every four weeks about their search activities, the number of applications 
they made,  the number of  search channels  they used for  this  applications and the 
number of job offers they received. In the end the authors had 722 individuals for which 
they  had  full  “search  histories”.  The  control  group  of  unemployed  workers  got  the 
traditional  counseling  and  monitoring  treatment  where  progress  in  finding  a  job  is 
discussed regularly  and there is  an occasional  check of  information.  The treatment 
group got more intense counseling and monitoring where more time is spent to discuss 
the applications thoroughly and more time is investigated to check search efforts so that 
the probability is higher to be “caught” for lack of search efforts or reporting of “fake” 
applications  and  to  be  penalized  accordingly.  The  authors  find  that  more  intense 
counseling and monitoring on average reduces the time unemployed need to find a job. 
For workers who came from temporary jobs counseling and monitoring did not help but 
for  those  that  lost  a  permanent  job  counseling  and  monitoring  increased  their 
application rate with 20%; and, because the match probability decreased with about 5% 
the job finding rate increased with 15%.8 
Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006)  investigate the effect of counseling 
and monitoring on the individual transition rate to employment of type I UI recipients. 
They use data from a field experiment. All UI recipients had to send in weekly reports 
concerning job search activities.  Once every four weeks,  the UI agency determined 
whether  the individual  was still  eligible  for  UI benefits.  The experiment  consisted of 
randomly assigning counseling and monitoring to part of the workers. So some workers 
8 The authors attribute the difference to the fact that workers who came from temporary jobs 
are more used to find a job quickly anyway; therefore more intense counseling and 
monitoring does not help.
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got “treated” with counseling and monitoring while others did not receive counseling and 
monitoring. The counseling and monitoring started with an intake meeting within three 
days after the start of the payment of the UI benefits. During this meeting the quality of 
application  letters  and  the  resume were  examined,  potential  search  channels  were 
discussed and a plan was made about what the individual  should do until  the next 
meeting. An important element of counseling and monitoring  was also to stimulate the 
unemployed worker to frequently contact the public employment offices for information 
about available job vacancies. During the intake meeting it was stressed that a positive 
and  active  attitude  toward  job  search  is  expected.  Follow-up  meetings  focused  on 
applications to specific job vacancies and employers. During these meetings the plan of 
the previous meeting was evaluated and a planning for the next period was made. If the 
unemployed worker did not comply with the plan, he could have been punished with a 
sanction  in  the  form  of  a  reduction  of  the  UI  benefits.  The  average  sanction  for 
insufficient job search was a 10% reduction of the UI benefits for a period of 2 months. 
Note that the counseling and monitoring requirements came on top of the reports on 
search activities  that  all  workers  had to  sent  in every week.  The scale  of  the field 
experiment was modest.  The database contains administrative information on about 
394 individuals who participated in the experiment. The entered the UI system in the 
last months of 1998 and the first months of 1999. The results of the analysis show that 
low-intensity job search assistance programs have at best small effects. High-intensity 
job search assistance programs may have a more positive effect on the exit rate to 
work.  Furthermore,  monitoring  of  relatively  well-qualified  individuals  in  favorable 
macroeconomic  conditions  leads  to  inefficient  substitution  of  search  methods  or 
channels. This also generates small net effects on the exit rate to work. Individuals with 
worse prospects may have less scope for substitution, and monitoring of their search 
activity may lead to an increase in the exit rate to work. Van den Berg and Van der 
Klaauw (2006) argue that it may make more sense to focus monitoring on individuals 
with worse opportunities. 
-3.4 Entitlement and eligibility criteria for older workers
Whereas many unemployed workers are confronted with strict search requirements and 
have to find a job to prevent a drop in income because they run out of UI benefits older 
workers  face a different incentive structure.  First,  because eligibility  criteria are less 
strict and second because potential benefit durations are expanded. An indication of 
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how eligibility  criteria  and entitlement  effects  influence job search behavior  of  older 
workers  is  provided by  Heyma and Van Ours  (2006)  who  study UI-inflow between 
January  1999 and  December  2001.  Up to  January  1,  2004 in  the  Netherlands  all 
unemployed  workers  were  obliged to  register  at  the employment  office  and had to 
accept a `suitable job' but once workers reached age 57.5 they were no longer required 
to actively search for work. The removal of the search requirement may affect the job 
finding rate since this removal is equivalent to removing the threat of benefit sanctions 
and removing the “moral pressure” to actively look for a job. Heyma and Van Ours 
(2006) also investigate the effects of extending the potential UI benefit duration up to 
the retirement age. In the Netherlands – up to August 2003 – once workers reached the 
age of 57.5 they were entitled to unemployment benefits up to the age of 65 after which 
they could collect old age benefits. Since workers above age 57.5 knew from the start 
of their unemployment spell that they could keep their benefits until they retired it was 
advantageous for workers to prevent entering unemployment just before age 57.5. If 
workers who were bound to be dismissed had some control over the timing of their 
dismissal they would try to become unemployed after the age of 57.5. This appears to 
be the case as there is a clear spike in the inflow into unemployment after age 57.5. 
Heyma and Van Ours (2006) find that the abolition of the requirement to actively search 
for a job as soon as a worker reaches the age of 57.5 has a large negative effect on 
their job finding rate. Furthermore, even before age 57.5 the job finding rate decreases 
with age suggesting that there is a negative anticipation effect. Workers close to the 
age of 57.5 do not expect to be confronted with a benefit sanction. The authors also find 
that  the entitlement rule which states that  from age 57.5 onwards  workers  entering 
unemployment can keep their unemployment benefits until the age of 65 has a large 
negative  effect  on  the  job  finding  rate.  Also  for  older  UI  recipients  it  is  clear  that 
incentives affect behavior. 
-4. UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
-4.1 Characteristics and developments 
Unemployment assistance benefits are part of the system of welfare benefits. Currently, 
for a couple welfare benefits are 100% of the minimum wage; a single parent gets 70% 
of the minimum wage and single persons – from 21 years onwards – are entitled to 
50%  of  the  minimum  wage.  Young  individuals  age  18  to  21  are  supposed  to  be 
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supported  financially  by their  parents.  UA benefits  recipients  have the obligation  to 
search for a job in order to remain entitled whereas other welfare benefit recipients do 
not have such an obligation. 
Figure 4 shows the development of number of UA benefits over the past decades. Up to 
the end of the 1980s the number of UA benefits resembles the development of the 
unemployment rates indicating that the fluctuations in unemployment in the Netherlands 
lead to workers ending up collecting UA benefits. The change in the UI benefits system 
in 1987 – discussed in detail in the previous section – led to larger fluctuations in UI 
benefits and smaller fluctuations in UA benefits. Indeed, the increase in unemployment 
rate in the early 1990s is hardly shown in the development of UA benefits. Figure 4 also 
shows some observations of inflow and outflow which are much smaller than the stock 
of UA benefits indicating that the average duration of UA benefits is quite high. Note 
that also in the early 21st century the numbers of UI and UA benefit recipients no longer 
move together; in the period 2001-2003 the annual inflow into UI went up from 250,000 
to 420,000 whereas the annual inflow into UA went up only from 100,000 to 110,000.
UA benefits support people without income who are not  entitled to any other 
benefits scheme. In addition, the individual must (i) be legally allowed to stay in The 
Netherlands,  and  (ii)  be  over  18  years.  UA  benefits  are  means-tested.  If  the 
unemployed worker has a partner with a sufficiently high income out of labor, or if the 
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worker has a sufficiently high amount of assets (like a house), then in general he does 
not qualify for welfare. 
BOX II. Unemployment assistance
The law on welfare benefits (ABW) was introduced in 1965 and intended as a safety net for 
people without income from labor and without benefits. 
Period 1: 1965 – 1986
Workers that ran out of UI benefits were entitled to maximum of 2 years of UA benefits (WWV) 
financed  by  the  government.  The  replacement  rate  was  75%.  Women  who  were  not 
breadwinners were not entitled to these benefits. If workers ran out of these benefits they were 
entitled to a second type of UA benefits (RWW) which could last indefinitely (until age 65). This 
type of benefits was means-tested. In 1985 the replacement rate for the first type of benefits 
was lowered to 70%. 
Period 2: 1987 –  2003 
In 1987 with the major restructuring of the social security system the first part of UA benefits 
(WWV) was merged with UI benefits. January 1 1996 the nature of unemployment assistance 
changed. With the exception of a couple of groups – in particular workers older than 57.5 years 
and single parents with a children under age 5 – all individuals collecting welfare benefits had 
to be available for paid work. The difference between unemployment assistance (RWW) and 
non-work  related  welfare  benefits  (ABW)  for  individuals  without  search-for-job  obligations 
vanished. For a couple welfare benefits are 100% of the minimum wage; a single parent gets 
70% of the minimum wage and single persons – from 21 years onwards – are entitled to 50% 
of the minimum wage. Young individuals age 18 to 21 are supposed to be supported financially 
by their parents. 
Period 3: From 2004 
January 1, 2004 a new welfare benefits law was introduced – the law of work and welfare 
(WWB). This new law gives municipalities responsibility for the financial  part  of the welfare 
benefits as well as for the flows of people from welfare to work. Up to then they could claim 
90% of the expenses from the government while they were fully responsible for bringing people 
from UA to a job which made it often cheaper to just pay benefits. Now they get a lump-sum 
from the government and they can choose how to allocate the money, i.e. paying benefits or 
investing in active labor market policies. 
Municipalities have power to provide bonuses on top of the basic benefits level. For 
example, some municipalities pay bonuses for the use of sports facilities and public 
transport, or for health-related expenses. The types of bonuses, the rules on entitlement 
to a bonus and the levels of the bonuses vary considerably across municipalities. For a 
long time the municipalities could claim a large part of their expenditures on UA benefits 
from the central government. The new Welfare Act introduced in 2004 changes this. It 
makes  local  authorities  financially  responsible  for  the  UA  benefits  they  provide.  In 
particular, local governments receive a fixed budget for UA benefits and activation. If 
they succeed in getting UA recipients back to work, saved funds can be used for other 
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local spending. This encourages local governments to invest in efficient administration, 
tight monitoring and tough activation programs. While no evaluation of the new Act has 
been carried out yet, it seems that indeed fewer people receive UA benefits (De Mooij, 
2006). 
-4.2 Benefit sanctions
Van den Berg et al.  (2004) analyze the effects of  sanctions on the behavior of  UA 
recipients. To illustrate how the sanction systems operates their description is used. A 
recipient of UA has similar obligations as a UI recipient in order to remain eligible for a 
benefit.  He has to  prevent  unnecessary job loss,  take actions to  prevent  him from 
staying unemployed and keep the welfare agency informed about everything that  is 
relevant to the payment of UA benefits. The exact guidelines may be determined by the 
municipalities. However, most municipalities have not formulated strict rules and leave 
some room for the discretion of the case worker. Therefore, the rules to which the UA 
recipients must comply do not only vary between municipalities, but also between case 
workers of the welfare agency.
A benefit sanction consists of a temporary reduction of the UA benefits level. 
The  duration  and  size  of  the  reduction  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  infringement. 
According  to  the  official  guidelines  there  are  four  categories  of  sanctions.  If  a  UA 
recipient does not register or renew his registration at a public employment office, a 
benefit reduction of 5% during 1 month is recommended. A sanction of 10% during 1 
month  is  recommended if  a  UA recipient  insufficiently  searches for  a  job,  neglects 
appointments  at  the  welfare  agency  and  does  not  cooperate  in  the  search  for 
appropriate  training  programs.  If  the  welfare  recipient's  behavior  interferes  with 
searching for a job or if he refuses training, a sanction can be imposed with a reduction 
of 20% during 1 month. A benefit reduction of 20% during 2 months is recommended if 
the UA recipient refuses an appropriate job offer or did not prevent unnecessary job 
loss  prior  to  entering  welfare.  The  duration  and  size  of  the  benefit  reductions  are 
relatively low in comparison to those for unemployment insurance (UI) recipients. Most 
UA benefit sanctions are only for one or two months and the maximum reduction of the 
welfare  benefit  is  20%.  Sometimes sanctions  are  imposed to  punish  UA recipients 
because  of  administrative  reasons  like  returning  late  from  holiday,  filling  in  forms 
incorrectly, etc. Nevertheless, the main reason to impose sanctions is noncompliance 
with job search guidelines. 
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The procedure of imposing a sanction consists of two steps. In the first step, it is 
established that  a  UA recipient  does not  comply with  the guidelines  of  the  welfare 
agency.  Information  on  possible  offenses  can  come  from  the  monthly  form  a  UA 
recipient  has to fill  in,  or from conversations between the employees of the welfare 
agency and the welfare recipient. In the second step of the sanction procedure, it is 
decided whether or not the noncompliance will be punished. Noncompliance does not 
always lead to a sanction. Local or district governments are responsible for the payment 
of  UA benefits,  but  the  national  government  has  set  binding  rules  and  procedures 
concerning the imposition of sanctions. The case workers of the welfare agency have 
some discretion to  interpret  the rules.  According to  the procedures,  the decision to 
impose a sanction on a particular UA recipient is taken by the local welfare employee 
after consulting a so called "decision maker''. The decision maker checks the proposal 
to  make sure  that  all  the  right  legal  steps  in  the  procedure  have been taken.  The 
employee of the welfare agency takes the state of the local labor market into account 
when deciding whether or not a sanction should be imposed. Furthermore, conditional 
on noncompliance with the guidelines, the decision to impose a sanction also depends 
on characteristics of the UA recipients like attitude, appearance and motivation.
Once  a  sanction  has  been  imposed,  the  welfare  agency  provides  the  UA 
recipient with some assistance on how to improve his behavior to avoid future sanction 
and on how to search for jobs more effectively. At the same time the behavior of the UA 
recipient is more closely monitored. If a sanction is imposed because of insufficient job 
search  activity,  then  the  welfare  agency  is  obliged  to  re-examine  the  job  search 
activities of the UA recipient within 3 months after the imposition. Based on the outcome 
of the renewal examination, the welfare agency may decide to renew the sanction or 
punish the UA recipient with a higher sanction. The period between the establishment 
of noncompliance by the case worker of the welfare agency and the imposition of a 
sanction is usually 1 to 2 months. In rare cases it may take years before noncompliance 
is established. 
Van den Berg et al. (2004) study the effect of benefits sanctions imposed on UA 
recipients. The analysis concerns all unemployed individuals who started to collect UA 
benefits   in  the  calendar  year  1994  in  Rotterdam,  the  second  largest  city  of  the 
Netherlands. The individuals were followed until they found a job or left the register for 
other reasons but ultimately until October 1996. By that time about 40% of the workers 
had found a job. In total about 15% of the individuals were confronted with a benefit 
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sanction. In the empirical analysis it is again important to account for selectivity in the 
imposition of a benefit sanction. As in Abbring et al.  (2005) the authors account for 
selectivity by modeling  both processes of finding jobs and getting benefit sanctions 
imposed,  and  the  correlation  between  the  two  through  observed  and  unobserved 
determinants. They show that if selectivity is not taken into account the effect of benefit 
sanctions on the job finding rate is underestimated to the extent that no effect is found. 
If  selectivity in the imposition of benefit  sanctions is accounted for a strong positive 
effect is found. A benefit sanction raises the transition rate from welfare to work by more 
than 140%, so the job finding rate more than doubles. The benefit  sanction itself  is 
temporary, but the effects turn out to be long lasting. Even after the sanction period 
expires the transition rate from welfare to work is higher than before the sanction was 
imposed. Apparently,  for UA recipients consumption smoothing is so difficult,  that a 
relatively small sanction (and the threat of an additional severe punishment in case of 
recidivism) can have a large effect on search behavior. 
-5. DISABILITY BENEFITS
-5.1 Characteristics and developments
Figure  5  shows the  evolution  of  stocks  and  flows  concerning  disability  benefits  for 
employees.9 The  number  of  disability  benefits  increases  quite  rapidly  from  about 
200,000 in 1970 to 750,000 in 1990. The inflow and outflow increase up to 1980 to 
fluctuate from then on. Over the whole time period up to the early 1990s the inflow into 
disability benefits is substantially larger than the outflow from disability benefits. In the 
1990s there are a number of reforms which are discussed in more detail below and 
over a couple of years in the mid 1990s the outflow is larger than the inflow causing the 
stock of disability benefits to decline. In the early 21st century there was again a major 
reform of the disability insurance system and the past couple of years outflow is again 
larger than inflow.  Recently,  the inflow into disability  insurance has gone down in a 
spectacular way. 
The incidence of disability benefits in the Netherlands is quite high compared to 
other  OECD  countries.  One  of  the  reasons  is  that  while  other  countries  make  a 
9 There are also disability benefits for self-employed which are ignored in this paper. Note that 
persons collecting disability benefits may be part-time disabled and may have a (part-time) 
job as well. In July 2002 for example there were 975,000 persons collecting disability benefits 
of which 245,000 had a job and 730,000 did not have a job.  
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distinction by whether the disability is work-related or not and only the first category is 
eligible for DI benefits, in the Netherlands this distinction is not made. 
Note: The peaks in the inflow into disability insurance are sometimes statistical artifacts. In 1976 
the  disability  insurance  was  expanded.  In  1998  civil  servants  were  also  covered  under  the 
disability insurance. The through in the inflow in 2005 is due to the extension of the waiting 
period from 1 to 2 years (see the main text for details). 
In 1967 when disability  insurance for  employees (WAO) was introduced. Under the 
terms of this law workers were insured against wage loss due to long-term disability. 
From then on if a worker became ill, he was allowed to claim a benefit under the illness 
scheme for a maximum period of one year. After that he could claim a disability benefit. 
Workers  were  entitled  to  disability  benefits  after  a  so-called  disability  examination, 
which consisted not only of a medical examination but also of an investigation of the 
labor market position of the worker. A worker could be considered disabled if there was 
no  suitable  job  for  him  at  his  own  educational  level  in  his  previous  occupation. 
Furthermore, unemployment was 'internalized', which means that those workers who 
were considered to be partially (more than 15%) disabled, could collect full disability 
benefits  because  it  was  assumed  that  partially  disabled  were  doomed  to  remain 
unemployed. The benefit had a maximum of 80% of the wage in the last job. Disability 
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benefits could be collected until age 65. 
BOX III. Disability insurance benefits
The  law  on  disability  insurance  (WAO)  was  introduced  July  1,  1967  with  the  purpose  of 
providing insurance to employees against the loss of income due to long-term disability.
Period 1: 1967 –  1986
A worker was considered to be disabled if due to illness of handicap (s)he was not able to earn 
through  working  the  amount  of  money  a  healthy  worker  with  similar  education  and  work 
experience could earn. Disability did not have to be related to work. The disability benefits were 
80% of  the  previous  wage  in  of  disability  percentages  from 80-100.  Individuals  that  were 
considered to be partly disabled could get full disability benefits. Furthermore, unemployment 
could be 'internalized' when establishing the degree of disability. October 1, 1976 a general 
disability law (AAW) was introduced. Because of the the disability insurance WAO was only 
paid if and when the amount was larger than the AAW-benefit. 
Period 2: 1987 – 1987 
From January 1,  1987 onwards disability  benefits were paid according to the extent  of  the 
disability  and  the  internalization  of  unemployment  was  abolished.  Up  to  January  1,  1987 
workers  and  employers  both  paid  contributions  from  which  the  disability  insurance  was 
covered. In 1987 workers were fully responsible. August 1, 1993 the law of reducing claims for 
disability  benefits  (TBA)  was  introduced.  This  law determined  that  education  and  previous 
occupation are no longer relevant in establishing the disability.  Workers who were disabled 
August 1, 1993 and were younger than 45 years were re-examined to establish whether or not 
they would qualify for disability benefits under the new criterion. January 1, 1996 WAO also 
applies to civil servants. 
Period 3: 1988-2005 
January 1, 1998 Law of premium differentiation and disability insurance market (Pemba) was 
introduced changing the financing of the disability insurance. From January 1, 1998 employers 
paid disability premiums that were partly experience rated. Furthermore,  AAW is replaced by 
specific benefits for self-employed and young disabled (15 to 24 years). April  1, 2002: Law 
improving Gatekeeper (Poortwachter) was introduced under which sick employees and their 
employers had a larger responsibility in reintegration. Up to then the worker was entitled to 
disability insurance after a 'waiting period' of 1 year – when the worker was disabled collecting 
sickness benefits. In case of insufficient efforts the evaluation of the claim for disability benefits 
could be postponed with maximum 1 year. From January 1, 2004 onwards the waiting period is 
2  years.  To stimulate  the  hiring  of  older  workers,  since  January  1,  2002 employers  get  a 
reduction of 2% for every workers that was at least 57 years. For every disabled worker hired 
the employer gets a reduction on disability premiums for 3 years. For every disabled worker 
that  is  replaced  within  the  same  firm  the  employer  gets  a  reduction  on  premiums  for  a 
maximum of 1 year. January 1, 2003 the experience rating was abolished for firms with less 
than 26 employees. 
Period 4: From 2006 
January 1, 2006 the Law Work and Income (WIA) is introduced in which the focus is not on 
insurance against disability but activating disabled workers. There are three types of disabled 
workers distinguished by the loss in earnings capacity.  If  the loss is smaller than 35% the 
worker remains employed at the current firm, if the loss is in between 35 and 80% receives a 
wage related disability benefit of which the duration depends on the age of the worker. Only 
workers who loose more than 80% of earnings capacity gets an indefinite wage-related benefit 
of 70% of the previous wage. 
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Since  the  introduction  the  number  of  workers  collecting  DI  benefits  has  increased 
massively.  This  huge  increase  in  the  numbers  on  disability  benefits  induced  the 
government to adjust the system several times. In 1985 the maximum replacement rate 
was reduced from 80% to 70%. In 1987 there was a major  restructuring of  the DI 
benefit system of which the main objective was to reduce the inflow into disability. The 
most important change was the abolition of the `internalization of unemployment'  rules. 
Partially disabled workers were considered as such and were expected to find a job or 
claim  unemployment  benefits  for  their  remaining  work  capacity.  The  reform  of  the 
disability insurance in 1987 was very important. Empirical studies find that before the 
1987 reform of the disability benefit system up to 50% of the disability enrollment was 
related to redundancy of workers.  Hassink et al. (1997) show that at the end of the 
1980s employers in the still used disability enrollment as an alternative to dismissals. 
They find that about 10% of the transitions into disability are due to redundancy of the 
worker. An implication of this result is that even after the social security reform of 1987, 
some employers and employees used disability enrollment to avoid dismissals. In the 
early 1990s there were some further changes. The disability insurance premium was 
experience rated, the disability examination no longer took the availability of suitable 
jobs with respect to education and previous occupation into consideration, the duration 
of the benefit was limited to five years after which a re-examination had to take place 
and, all disabled workers younger than 50 years had to be re-examined. In 2002 the so 
called “gatekeeper” model was extended. In this model employers and workers carry 
more responsibility concerning the inflow of workers into disability. 
In 2006, the government replaced the disability scheme by the Law on Work and 
Income According to Labor Capacity – WIA (see De Mooij (2006) for details). Just like 
the WAO, the WIA offers insurance for occupational diseases and employment injuries 
(risque professionnel) and for other risks (risque social). People can apply for WIA after 
a period of two years of sick leave, which are covered by employers. The WIA consists 
of two schemes: one for the fully and longterm disabled (IVA), and one for the partially 
disabled (WGA). Fully and long-term disabled means that someone will never be able 
to earn more than 20% of his previous salary. The IVA equals 75% of the final wage 
until  retirement. It is financed by uniform national premiums paid by employers.  The 
WGA applies to people who are less than fully disabled, but who have lost more than 
35% of their previous work capacity. During the first period, the WGA entitles a partially 
disabled worker to a benefit based on his last earned wage. If he still works, the benefit 
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equals 70% of the difference between his last salary and his new (lower) wage. If he 
does not work, the benefit is 70% of the last wage. The duration of the benefits is in 
accordance with the rules of the UI. When this duration expires, a WGA claimant is 
entitled to a follow-up benefit. This benefit is lower if the WGA claimant does not work, 
which gives an incentive to maintain in the labor market. Partially disabled workers who 
incur  less  than  35% drop  in  wages  are  not  entitled  to  WGA benefits.  From 2007 
onwards,  the  WGA will  be  partly  privatized.  In  particular,  employers  will  have  the 
opportunity to opt out of the public system and switch to private insurance companies. 
The premium in the WGA will be experience rated. This gives employers an incentive to 
prevent disability. 
-5.2 Screening DI applications 
De  Jong  et  al.  (2006)  investigate  the  effects  of  intensified  screening  of  disability 
insurance benefit applications under the previous system when sick employees had a 
one  year  waiting  period  before  entering  DI.  During  this  period  employers  were 
responsible for financing sickness payments. Collective bargaining agreements ensured 
that sick workers received 90 to 100% of their net salary. After 13 weeks of sickness 
absence the employer reported the sick employee to the public administrator of the UI 
and DI schemes. If  the worker had not fully returned to work before 39 weeks,  the 
worker and employee filed a DI benefit claim which should have been accompanied by 
a  reintegration  report,  containing the reintegration  plan  as drafted  after  8  weeks  of 
sickness absenteeism, and an assessment on why it  has not  (yet)  resulted in work 
resumption.  The  case  worker  checked  this  reintegration  report.  If  the  report  was 
delayed,  incomplete,  or  proved that  the reintegration efforts  by the sick worker  and 
employer had been insufficient the DI benefit application was not processed and the 
case  worker  could  decide  to  start  a  sanction  procedure.  In  almost  all  cases  of 
noncompliance  the  employer  was  hold  responsible,  which  means  that  almost  all 
sanctions were imposed on employers.  A sanction to the employer  implies that  the 
employer is obliged to continue sick pay for some additional months after the regular 
waiting period elapsed. 
De Jong et al. (2006) use the results from an experiment, where case workers at 
some  local  administrative  offices  were  instructed  to  implement  a  more  intensive 
screening policy of the reintegration reports. The standard (national) procedure was to 
screen the reintegration reports "on paper" and to only contact the employer and/or sick 
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worker directly if there were clear signals of negligence. In the “treatment” offices the 
case workers always had to contact or visit the employer and/or the sick employee. The 
behavior of the case workers was monitored to check that screening in the treatment 
offices was indeed more intensive than in the other offices. Indeed, in the treatment 
offices the time spent on screening reintegration reports by the case workers was 40% 
higher than in the other offices. The data cover the period from 2001 until 2003. The 
more intensive screening of reintegration reports became effective in January 2003 and 
was  not  announced  beforehand.  The  authors  find  that  the  intensified  screening 
decreases long-term sickness absenteeism and DI applications, both with about 5%. 
They  argue  that  the  reduction  in  long-term  sickness  absenteeism  is  due  to  self-
screening by potential DI applicants and that for DI applications the decline is due to a 
direct effect on work resumption during sickness absence. And, because the costs of 
intensified screening are only a small fraction of the benefits of averted DI payments it 
is very much cost efficient. 
-6. CONCLUSIONS
This  paper  presents  information  about  the  evolution  of  the  Dutch  labor  market  in 
particular  about  the  developments  in  unemployment  insurance,  unemployment 
assistance  and  disability  insurance.  The  emphasis  in  the  presentation  is  on  how 
incentives affect  the dynamics in these benefits.  In the 1960s and 1970s the social 
security system in the Netherlands rapidly expanded. Its main characteristics were easy 
access and little incentives to leave. In the early 1980s unemployment increased rapidly 
and the system was no longer sustainable. In 1987 there was a major restructuring of 
the system and in the 1990s further changes were introduced with a focus on financial 
incentives.  Now  in  the  early  year  of  the  21st century  there  is  again  a  major 
reconstruction emphasizing incentives even more . 
In UI benefits the emphasis shifted from paying money because workers face a 
drop in their  income to paying money to give them time to find a new job.  This is 
observationally  equivalent  except  for  the  strong  emphasis  on incentives.  The same 
holds for UA benefits. The emphasis shifted from providing income support to finding 
work. To some extent this even hold for the system of disability benefits.
It is difficult to find the characteristics of an optimal social security system. Not 
only  does the  economic  environment  change continuously,  social  attitudes  and the 
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political arena also change. Over the past decades there has been a shift in perception 
about unemployment and disability: from exogenous events that are difficult to influence 
to events for which the individual worker and firm bear at least some responsibility. And 
because of that strong incentives are needed. The main conclusion of this paper is that 
indeed these incentives affected the behavior of the individual workers and firms.  
The main lesson of the Dutch experience for other countries is that in order to 
protect  the  benefit  system from  deteriorating  or  even  collapsing  the  right  financial 
incentives  have  to  be  provided  to  all  actors  –  workers,  employers  and  benefit 
administrators. These financial incentives concern screening of workers who want to 
enter the benefit system, counseling and monitoring of workers that are in the benefit 
system and sanctions for workers or employers that abuse the system. It is also clear 
that one cannot simply reorganize one type of benefits ignoring others. Benefits are 
communicating vessels. Reorganizing UI benefits may lead to more inflow into disability 
benefits,  restructuring  disability  benefits  may  lead  to  more  inflow  into  UI  and  UA 
benefits. Only a comprehensive reform of the benefit system will have beneficial effects 
for the functioning of labor markets.
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